Different from previous experiments that used three representations of uncertain information for probabilities: best estimate, interval, and sets of probabilities, we use visual display to represent different levels of uncertainty through varying amount of probabilistic information provided to subjects. Results confirm that the individuals' willingness to pay is higher when a larger amount of information is available. Further, individuals are found uncertainty averse for high probability of gain and uncertainty seekers for low probability of gain. Similarities in results across different representations of uncertainty indicate that the representation tested here is a viable method for communicating uncertainty to decision makers.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the economic literature, most firm and consumer theories are based on the assumption of perfect information. In real life, however, economic agents make decisions under risk and uncertain conditions, for example, investing in a portfolio when the return to investment is uncertain or introducing a new product to the market when consumers' buying intentions are ambiguous. One of the most important factors that affect policy making in such situations is the amount of information possessed by the decision-maker. Information regarding the probabilities of outcome situations is particularly important.
With respect to this, since Knight (1921) , a risky event is defined as one with the probabilities of multiple possible outcomes that are known and an uncertainty event is defined as one with probabilities of outcomes that are unknown. As stated by Ellsberg (1961) , ambiguity regarding probability mainly depends on the information about probabilities, thus "ambiguity is the quality depending on the amount, type, reliability, and unanimity of information, giving rise to one's degree of confidence in an estimate of relative likelihood" (see also Yates and Zukowski, 1976; Larson, 1980) . Following this lead, a considerable number of experimental studies have dealt with the issue of comparing individual valuations under known probabilities (risk) versus unknown probabilities (ambiguity). Accordingly, the distinction between known and unknown probability situations has become a focal issue and is referred to as risk versus uncertainty by Knight (1921) , unambiguous versus ambiguous by Ellsberg (1961) , and precise versus vague by other scholars (e.g., Kuhn and Budescu, 1996) . The terms ambiguity and uncertainty are used interchangeably in this paper. The missing information about probabilities was presented verbally in these studies as "doubts about the credibility of source" (Kagel and Roth, 1995) , an expert opinion (best estimate), or as interval of probabilities (e.g., Curley and Yates, 1985; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989) . Interestingly, however, not much work has been devoted to analyzing the effects of different display formats on reactions to uncertainty.
This experimental study uses an original visual representation of uncertainty to compare valuations of lotteries under known, unknown, and vague probabilities of gain. Different from prior works that used verbal/numeric formats such as a best estimate, interval, or sets of probabilities, we use a visual display format to represent uncertainty situations. As Bisantz et al. (2005) note visual displays such as graphical or colour icons are in fact more viable methods than numeric/linguistic representations for such communication processes. Specifically, we examine whether individuals' reactions (as indicated by willingness to pay measures) to ambiguity (as a second-order probability distribution) is sensitive to the amount of information about the probability of a gain. Our experiment also investigates individual risk and uncertainty attitudes.
As additional distinctive aspects, our experimental process introduces multiple degrees of uncertainty through manipulating ranges of probability intervals and examines individual responses also in (no information type) vague probability of gain situations. Considering the fact that economic agents and policy makers in real life settings have to rely on continuously changing degrees of uncertain information situations, as in the cases of new product introductions, new technology, military planning, or stock market purchases, the use of multiple uncertainty situations as well as the introduction of vague probability cases in the study represents a much higher level of external validity Finally, note that, whereas SEU predicts decision-makers to be ambiguity neutral, empirical research on the issue indicate unequivocal results (e.g., Curley and Yates, 1985; Cohen et al., 1987; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986 , Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985 Kahn and Sarin, 1988) . For instance, Ellsberg's (1961) experiment imply that individuals are ambiguity seeking when the probability of the known urn is small, while they tend to be ambiguity averse when the expected probability is high. Likewise, Hogarth and Einhorn (1990) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 1 predict ambiguity preference at low probability of gains. Using a nonmarket/noncompetitive elicitation method, the BDM procedure (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964) , our study further reveals whether this pattern is robust across different display formats for the representation of ambiguity.
The next section reviews extant literature about the characterization of uncertainty. This will lead to the research questions we pursue, followed by the experimental design, results, and conclusions.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE CHARACTERIZATION OF AMBIGUITY
The literature on ambiguity has focused primarily on probabilistic ambiguity. There are several theoretical models that have been proposed to accommodate ambiguity effects (see Camerer and Weber 1992, for details) . Most of the theoretical models identify ambiguity either with a second-order probability distribution (Ellsberg, 1961; Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1982, Segal, 1987) or with the incapability of individuals to form subjective probabilities consistent with probability laws (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) . Thus, the ambiguity has been made operational through natural events (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Tversky and Fox, 1995) and chance processes (such as second order probabilities and Ellsberg's urn, 1961) .
Some studies made uncertainty operational by real/natural events (amongst others Tversky and Fox, 1995; Fox et al., 1996 as examples for non-market experiments; see Di Mauro, 2008 for a market experiment), they tested decision maker's perceived knowledge of the uncertain event, such as Heath and Tversky (1991) 's competence hypothesis. People preferred betting on events they knew a lot about holding beliefs constant.
On the other hand, most experimental studies have used chance processing and have elicited individual reactions to ambiguity in market settings (Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989; Sarin and Weber, 1993; Di Mauro and Maffioletti, 2001) . They used either semi-markets or double auctions as market organization, loss or gains as the domain of payoffs, and they made ambiguity operational through either second order probability distributions or the Ellsberg's urn. Sarin and Weber (1993) used the gain domain and found a significant impact of ambiguity, while Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) refering to insurance found a weak effect. Both operationalized uncertainty as a second-order distribution. Lauriola and Levin (2001) observed only slight aversion, Budescu et al. (2002) fail to conclude strong attitudes, while Di Mauro and Maffioletti (2004) and Du and Budescu (2005) suggested significant aversion. The recent study by Chakravarty and Roy (2009) , using multiple price list method, found subjects ambiguity neutral over gains in the aggregate.Overall, most market studies have found that the effect of ambiguity in markets is weak.
For the chance processing operationalization, alternative descriptions of ambiguity has been used in several experiments (see Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989; Sarin and Weber, 1993) . Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989) used both best estimate and probability interval. According to their "Anchoring and Adjustment" model, individuals assess ambiguous probabilities by anchoring on some reference value then adjusting this value upwards or downwards. More explicitly, the ambiguity attitudes may switch according to the probability level. Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982) and Sarin and Weber (1993) used an ambiguity scenario involving sets of four probability measures and generally predicted ambiguity aversion (for the insurance context), not a switch of attitudes due to probability levels. Di Mauro and Maffioletti (2004, page 363) , using interval and best estimate representations found that there is low ambiguity aversion pattern when the probability of gain is small (3%) and it becomes stronger for the probability of 80%. Hence, ambiguity aversion increases with the probability of gain, however, there exists no switch from one attitude of ambiguity to the other. Further, for intermediate probabilities (such as 0.5), the median ratio of ambiguous to risky bids is around one.
" Curley and Yates (1985) presented subjects a series of ambiguous lotteries differing in the size of the probability interval" (Highhouse, 1994) . Consistent with Larson (1980) and Yates and Zukowski (1976) , they failed to find strong support for the proposition of Becker and Brownson (1964) that ambiguity avoidance is an increasing function of the size of the probability interval. Bowen et al. (1994) , using the method of expanding the range of probability through the number of winning poker chips, found that "ambiguity avoidance can only be found reliably at interval estimate ranges of 0.7 and greater".
In our experimental setting, ambiguity is made operational by means of chance processes where individual perception of knowledge does not mainly depend on learning, experience, or skill (competence). Further, our representation is a manipulative version of the interval of probability. For instance, the probability of gain of a lottery with no information (all balls uncoloured) lies between 0 and 1, whereas the probability of gain of a lottery with two coloured balls (out of 20) with one colour representing gain and the other one representing zero earnings lies between 1/20 and 19/20, given the same expected value. However, in the previous studies the intervals of the probabilities have been very precisely given as a range of possible numerical values. Different from other experiments, we used a visual format to display uncertainty which also allow the experimenter to introduce full uncertainty (no information cases) or different degrees of uncertainty (some information cases) much more easier then the best estimate, interval, or sets of probability which requires verbal descriptions. Our representation is not numeric and our visual display format might express individuals' degree of comfort with the probabilistic information by changing the amount they are willing to pay. In fact, "it has been argued (Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, 1996) that numerical range presentations of uncertainty should be avoided because decision makers will focus only on the most stringent (worst) presented value" (Kuhn and Budescu, 1996) .
Ideally an experimenter wants a devise to represent ambiguity that (1) cannot be manipulate by the experimenter; (2) is transparent; (3) does not allow to calculate probabilities on an objective basis; (4) is not subject specific; (5) allows different degree of uncertainty. It is difficult to find a devise that meets all these requirements. If we had decided to use the classic Ellsberg's story we could have told subjects the following: suppose that you confront two urns containing red and black balls, from one of which a ball will be drawn at random. To "bet on Red I" will mean that you choose to draw from Urn I; and that you will receive a prize a (say $100) if you draw a red ball ("if Red I occurs") and a smaller amount b (say, $0) if you draw a black ("if not-Red I occurs"). Urn I contains 100 red and black balls, but in a ratio entirely unknown to you; there may be from 0 to 100 red balls. In Urn II, you confirm that there are exactly 50 red and 50 black balls. An observer -who, let us say, is ignorant of the state of your information about the urns -sets out to measure your subjective probabilities by interrogating you as to your preferences in the following pairs of gambles:
 "Which do you prefer to bet on, Red I or Black I: or are you indifferent?"  "Which do you prefer to bet on, Red II or Black II?"  "Which do you prefer to bet on, Red I or Red II?"  "Which do you prefer to bet on, Black I or Black II?"
If we had wanted to be more sophisticated we could have told subjects Halevy's (2007) story:
"Consider the following scenario. There are four boxes, each containing 10 chips, which can be either red or black. The composition of chips in the boxes is as follows: Box 1: Contains 5 red chips and 5 black chips. Box 2: The number of red and black chips is unknown. It could be any number between 0 red chips (and 10 black chips) and 10 red chips (and 0 black chips).
Box 3: The number of red and black chips is determined as follows: one ticket is chosen from a bag containing 11 tickets with the numbers 0 to 10 written on them. The number written on the drawn ticket will determine the number of red chips in the third box. For example, if the ticket drawn is 3, then there will be 3 red chips and 7 black chips. Box 4: The composition of chips in this box is determined in a manner similar to box 3, but instead of 11 tickets in the bag, there are 2, with the numbers 0 and 10 written on them. Therefore, the box may contain either 0 red chips (10 black chips) or 10 red chips (0 black chips)."
Ellsberg's "Urn I" and Halevy's' "Box 2" are indeed uncertain, but unfortunately their implementation in the laboratory is not easy. The main problem is what subjects should know about "Urn I" and "Box 2" It is not only a problem of not defeating subjects, but we want also be completely transparent to them. If we use Ellsberg "Urn I", we should tell to the subjects (when they ask) how we composed the urn. If we tell them, then the urn is not any more uncertain, but if we do not give them any information, they will become suspicious about "Urn I". They can think that "Urn I" was composed in such a way to minimize their final payoff. Following this root the ambiguous urn changed its nature to the suspicious urn.
We have similar problems also with "Box 2": some of the possible ways of composing "Box 2" are those which are described as "Box 3" and "Box 4". What is crucial about "Box 2" is that probabilities are not knowable. This is the essential point. In "Box 3" and "Box 4", probabilities are knowable. We would argue that "Box 3" and "Box 4" do not capture the essential point that the probabilities are not knowable, and also induce the subjects to think in terms of second-order probabilities. An alternative way is to have statements about which the subject may know nothing. For example, "state 1 occurs if the stock exchange index in Accra at 12 noon tomorrow is above 36777". But what happens if you have a Ghanaian in your subjects? Or a world expert on stock exchanges in strange places? There is no longer ambiguity for all the subjects. The experimenter has lost control. Hey et al. (2007 Hey et al. ( , 2008 proposed to use a Bingo Blower to generate genuine uncertainty. All the balls inside a Bingo Blower can at all times be seen by people outside, but unless the number of balls in the Blower is low -the number of balls of differing colours can not be counted: they are continually moving around. Hence the balls in the bingo can be seen but not counted, and the information available is not sufficient to calculate probabilities. The probabilities exist but are unknowable. Even if this uncertainty representation is very original it does not fully met all above requirements, indeed Hey's procedure cannot be manipulated by the experimenter, and probabilities cannot be calculated on an objective basis, but somehow it is subject specific (i.e. there are subjects that are very good in counting blowing balls, there are subjects that have problems with colours, in all these cases the experimenter lose control). Indeed it is not possible to model different degrees of uncertainty.
If we look at our representation of uncertainty in greater details, it certainly is in the spirit of Ellsberg, thus ambiguous probabilities have been made operational with a secondorder probability distribution, but it is visual rather than verbal/numerical. More precisely, in our experiment, the information about the probability of gaining money (the lottery) is represented through 20 circles/balls in a row coloured either yellow or red that appears on the computer screen. If a red ball comes up, subjects get nothing, if a yellow ball comes up, subjects earn 10 €. Further, if all 20 balls are coloured yellow or red, then subjects are assumed to have full information about the probability that represents the risky situation. For the uncertainty case, each subject is faced with different levels of uncertainty through various amounts of information about the colours of the balls provided to them. Specifically, when some of the balls out of 20 in a row are uncoloured, it means subjects do not know whether they are yellow or red, then the situation is defined as the uncertain situation with unknown probability. Further, as the number of uncoloured balls increases, the degree of uncertainty increases. Subjects see each lottery one at a time on the screen (with different amounts of probability information) and decide how much they are willing to pay for buying it. The main advantage is that the procedure is transparent and subjects receive some information on the uncertain urn, they can see a sample of the balls that compose the uncertain urn, but they do not know the actual probabilities of drawing yellow or red.
Additionally, our format enables to represent different degrees of uncertainty and also allows testing the valuations in "no information", vague probability of gain situations. Hogarth and Kunreuther (1995) summarized nine possible known, unknown, and vague probabilistic situations (Table 1) .Cell 1 and Cell 2 are the most widely studied situations in the literature (e.g., Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989) , and there are few such situations on Cell 3 and Cell 4 (Ho et al., 2002; Kunreuther et al., 1995) ; however, to our knowledge, no study was done on the remaining five situations. With respect to that, while previous representations of uncertainty such as best estimate probability or interval of probabilities allow examining and making comparisons between individual behaviours for Cell 1, Cell 2, Cell 3, and Cell 4, by using our visual method, one can investigate the decisionmaking processes in the other five cells in addition to the first four cells.
(Insert Table 1) III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN The experiment was run at the experimental economics laboratory of The Strategic Interaction Group at the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena. The software of the computerised experiment was developed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . 64 students from Jena University were recruited randomly to participate in the experiment using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004) . Participants received written instructions after being seated at a computer terminal.
The experiment is conducted in the gain domain by using the BDM (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964) procedure to elicit individual willingness to pay (WTP) for buying lotteries. In the experiment, each of the 23 lotteries (Figure 1 ) is presented to all 64 subjects 2 . The information about the probabilities of these lotteries are provided through 20 balls in a row coloured in Yellow ( ) and Red ( ). If a red ball comes up, subjects get nothing; if a yellow ball comes up they earn 10 €. If all 20 balls are coloured, then subjects have full probability information, if some of the balls are uncoloured, we say that they have incomplete probability information. Further, as the number of uncoloured balls increases, the degree of uncertainty increases. Then they are asked to indicate their maximum buying price for each lottery where their monetary endowment is 10 €. At the end of the experiment, one lottery is selected randomly to play for real; this determines the cash payments. In order to resolve uncertainty, we generated random numbers between 0 and 20 to determine the number of red balls in a row. All of the procedure was computerized. More specifically, when for example the randomly selected lottery is Lottery 3, where 6 out of 20 balls in a row are coloured. The computer draws a random number between 0 and 14 (out of uncoloured balls). The whole procedure was common knowledge.
(Insert Figure 1 ) More specifically, the first row of Figure 1 reports the lotteries with full uncertainty (no information about the colours of the balls), whereas, the second row has more/partial information with two balls coloured. If the last row of the lotteries with certain probability comes up on the screen, the subject will know that his/her chance of earning 10 € is 2 out of 20 and of getting nothing is 18 out of 20. Each subject sees a different uncertain probability lottery followed by the lotteries with known probabilities. Looking at Figure 1 
IV. RESULTS
Our results are based on the analysis of the responses of the 64 subjects who participated in our experiment. The age of the 39 females and 25 males ranged from 19 to 31 with an average of 24.64 years, and from 18 to 30 with an average of 22.97 years, respectively. The average earnings amounted to 10.97 € (sd = 3.43 €) for a duration of 60 minutes.
According to the results in Table 2 , the average willingness to pay for buying a lottery with an expected value less than 5 € is higher for uncertain lotteries than for risky lotteries. For example, for the probability 0.20, the WTP value for buying lottery 10 (the uncertain lottery) is 3.31 €, whereas the WTP value for buying lottery 23 (the risky lottery) is 0.69 €, further both lotteries have the same expected value 2 €. On the other hand, when the expected value of the lottery is at least equal to 5 €, subjects' WTP values are higher for risky lotteries than uncertainty one. For example, for the probability 0.80, the WTP value for buying lottery 7 (the uncertain lottery) is 1.80 €, whereas the WTP value for buying lottery 19 (the risky lottery) is 4.32 €, subjects are willing to pay more for a risky lottery with the same expected value of 8 €). Further, for an expected value of 8 €, for example, the average willingness to pay values increase from 1.8 € to 2.722 € and to 3.386 € as the number of uncoloured balls (degree of uncertainty) decreases (as the information provided about the probability increases).
(Insert Table 2 ) These differences are statistically significant at both the 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels for the paired-samples t-test; which is also supported by Wilcoxon rank-sum test results demonstrated in Table 3 . Thus, the valuations for risky and ambiguous lotteries, regardless of degree of uncertainty, were not derived from the same parental distribution. For example, for the probability of gain= 0.80 and gain amount=10 Euros (expected value=8), average WTP values for certain probability lottery that contains no uncoloured balls (lottery 19) is statistically different than both the low uncertain probability lottery that contains 4 uncoloured balls (lottery 9) (p-value = 0.000< 0.05) and the high uncertain probability lottery contains 15 uncoloured balls (lottery 7) (p-value = 0.000< 0.05). In addition, there exists a statistically significant difference between WTP values of lotteries with the different degrees of uncertainty. For example, for expected value 8, the WTP values for low uncertain probability lottery (lottery 9) and the high uncertain probability lottery (lottery 7) (p-value = 0.000< 0.05).
When we compare our results with Bowen et al. (1994) , for high probabilities of gain, even for the interval estimate ranges below 0.7, as the ranges increases (in our case as the amount of information about the probability decreases), ambiguity avoidance increases (consistent with e.g., Camerer and Weber, 1992; Yates and Stone, 1992) . For example, for lottery 9 which has the degree of uncertainty 4/20, the probaility of gain (yellow balls) ranges between 0.65 (considering all of the uncoloured balls being red, 13 balls out of 20) and 0.85 (considering all of the uncoloured balls being yellow, 17 balls out of 20), yet the ambiguity avoidance is greater than the other lotteries (that have the same expected value that is equal to 8) with less information about the probability..
Interesting to observe is that for the lotteries with the expected value 5 (lottery 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 21), the lottery which has half the balls coloured and half uncoloured, lottery 4, has a similar WTP to the lottery 1 3 which has all the balls uncoloured. Bruine de Bruin et al. (2000 Bruin et al. ( , 2002 have examined how people react differently to 50-50 gambles than to other types of gambles.
(Insert Table 3)
We measured uncertainty attitude (Table 4 ) by using the ratio of the value of an individual's willingness to pay to buy the lottery (WTP) with some degree of uncertain probability to his/her WTP value for the certain probability lottery (WTPU/WTPC). WTPU/WTPC values that are higher than one indicate uncertainty seeking, whereas value lower than one indicates that the subject is uncertainty averse. Further, when the WTPU/WTPC is equal to one, the subject has an uncertainty neutral attitude. Accordingly, individuals are uncertainty averse for high probabilities of gain (probabilities of 0.8, 0.75, and 0.5) and uncertainty seekers for low probabilities of gain (probabilities of 0.25, and 0.2).
(Insert Table 4) V. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated how the amount of information about probability of gain affects individual valuations of ambiguity. We employed an original display format to represent ambiguity where the amount of information given to subjects to determine the influence of various levels of ambiguity on valuation varies. Thus, ambiguity avoidance can be defined as an aversion to choosing options for which there is missing information (e.g., Heath and Tversky, 1991; Winkler, 1991) . This is done simply by using 20 balls that are coloured either yellow, red or are left uncoloured. The number of uncoloured balls determines the level of ambiguity: the greater is the number of uncoloured balls, the higher is the level of ambiguity. In real life, economic agents do have different levels of information for different events. For example, when introducing a totally new product to the market or in the choice of new technology, in the beginning the decision maker has no information including expert information at hand in a way that can be represented as a "best estimate" or a numeric range or an "interval" about the probability of success. Therefore, in these situations, it is more adequate to represent probabilistic ambiguity through different amounts of information. Hence, our uncertainty visualization provide numerous application domains for government policies that rely on different degrees of uncertain information situations, including military planning, choice of new technology, investment in new industries or countries, stock market purchases and sales (see Bisantz et al. 2005 for implications of visual display format). In addition, the result of our experiment stating that the uncertainty avoidance behaviour exists in aggregate leads to the conclusion that there is demand for ambiguity-reducing information by economic agents and this "may help explain potential anomalies like uninformative advertising and alleged medical overtesting" (Kagel and Roth, 1995) .
Through our representation, we concluded that as the ambiguity level increases through a decrease in the amount of information, individuals put lower values for their willingness to buy the lottery. Thus, the uncertainty avoidance behaviour exists in aggregate, a result which is consistent with many earlier experiments that used other representation methods, such as best estimate, interval, and sets of probabilities (e.g., Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1985; Gonzalez-Vallejo, Bonazzi and Shapiro, 1996; Kuhn and Budescu, 1996; Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989; Sarin and Weber, 1993) . Therefore, we can say that the results obtained are analogous across methodologies.
Further, individuals are uncertainty-averse for high probabilities of gain and uncertainty-seekers for low probabilities of gain. This finding is consistent with Ellsberg (1961) experiment impling that individuals are ambiguity seeking when the probability of the known urn is small, while they tend to be ambiguity averse when the expected probability is high. Likewise, our conclusion is parallel with models of Hogarth and Einhorn (1990) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) that predict ambiguity preference at low probability of gains. Indeed, the presence of ambiguity aversion/seeking attitude of individuals in the face of the incentive-compatible elicitation mechanism may show the relevance of ambiguity in market allocations. In sum, we argue that the original visual representation of uncertainty used in this study is a viable method (as opposed to numeric/linguistic representations) for communicating uncertainty to decision makers. The main advantage of using our visual representation is that a researcher can examine and compare decision-maker's choices under risky situations (with precise information about probability), uncertain situations (with some information about probability), and when there is no information about probability. In the case of the representation formats that have been used in earlier literature (linguistic representations), best estimate and interval of probabilities do not allow testing particularly the case where individuals have no information about the probability. However, situations like that are common in real life. For example, we have no information on the likelihood that the washing machine will not work and on the possible costs of repairing it in the future when we have to decide whether or not buying a warranty at a particular price.
Whether the results are robust to changes in the domain, varying levels of probability, and frame or not is an open empirical question for future research. Future experimental studies could examine the effects of different types of probabilistic ambiguity situations such as the individual valuation of compound lotteries (Yates and Zukowski, 1976; Larson, 1980) . For example, as part of our future research agenda, we intend to examine whether individuals would bet on known probabilities p rather than on compound lotteries with mean p. Probability Certain probabilityLow uncertain probability lottery Certain probabilityHigh uncertain probability lottery High uncertain probability-Low uncertain probability lottery 0. * The probability of gain= 0.80 and gain amount=10 Euros (EV=8). Certain probability lottery contains no uncoloured balls (lottery 19), low uncertain probability lottery contains 4 uncoloured balls (lottery 9), and high uncertain probability lottery contains 15 uncoloured balls (lottery 7). ** The probability of gain= 0.75 and gain amount=10 Euros (EV=7.5). Certain probability lottery contains no uncoloured balls (lottery 20), low uncertain probability lottery contains 4 uncoloured balls (lottery 18), and high uncertain probability lottery contains 16 uncoloured balls (lottery 15). ***The probability of gain= 0.50 and gain amount=10 Euros (EV=5). Certain probability lottery contains no uncoloured balls (lottery 21), low uncertain probability lottery contains 2 uncoloured balls (lottery 6), and high uncertain probability lottery contains 18 uncoloured balls (lottery 2). ****The probability of gain= 0.25 and gain amount=10 Euros (EV=2.5). Certain probability lottery contains no uncoloured balls (lottery 22), low uncertain probability lottery contains 4 uncoloured balls (lottery 14), and high uncertain probability lottery contains 16 uncoloured balls (lottery 11).
NOTE: For the probability of gain= 0.20 and gain amount=10 Euros (EV=2), the Z-value is -5,905 (with p-value=0.000) for the comparison between the average WTP values of certain probability lottery contains no uncoloured balls (lottery 23) and the uncertain probability contains 10 uncoloured balls (lottery 10). * Individual willingness to pay value to buy a lottery with uncertain probability divided by the willingness to pay value to buy the lottery with certain probability. For example Lottery= "7/19" means the willingness to pay value to buy Lottery 7 divided by the willingness to pay value to buy Lottery 19. The probability of gaining 10 Euros is 0.8, thus the expected value is 8 (probability of gain is 4/5 for Lottery 7 and 16/19 for Lottery 19). However, Lottery 7 has 15 uncoloured balls (see Figure 1 ).
APPENDIX. Sample Instructions

Instructions
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. This is an experiment in economic decision-making under risk and uncertainty. If you follow the instructions carefully you can make money that will be paid to you in cash at the end. It is strictly forbidden to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. In the beginning of the experiment, you will get 10 Euro as your initial endowment. You will use this money to make separate decisions of buying 23 different lotteries. Once you complete all your decisions for all lotteries, one of them will be selected randomly and played for real to determine your cash payment at the end of the experiment. For that reason, when you make your decisions, you should note that for each lottery situation your endowment is 10 Euro. For some lotteries, you will have full information about the probabilities and for others you will have none or partial information about the probabilities. The lotteries will be in the form of RED, YELLOW and UNCOLOURED balls arranged in a row, which represent certain probabilities for each lottery. For example: A lottery that has a probability of 20% of getting 10 Euro and 80% of getting nothing is represented as:
ON THE SCREEN:
There is a row with 8 RED and 2 YELLOW balls (10 balls in total). If the RED ball is selected you will get nothing and if the YELLOW ball is selected you will get 10 Euro. For the above lottery, all the balls are coloured either YELLOW or RED, so you know the exact probability of the lottery, thus you have full information about the probability. There will also be some lotteries represented with uncoloured balls in a row meaning that you do not have full information about the probabilities because you do not know whether uncoloured balls are YELLOW or RED. For example: ON THE SCREEN: There is a row with 4 RED, 1 YELLOW, and 5 UNCOLOURED balls (10 balls in total). If the RED ball is selected you will get nothing and if the YELLOW ball is selected you will get 10 Euro. For each lottery situation, you will be asked to state the maximum price you are willing to pay to buy the lottery. Once you complete this task, one out of 25 lottery situations will be chosen randomly and would be played for real. Whether you get the lottery will depend on whether your stated buying price is greater or equal to the random price. The random price is a number between 0 and 10 that will be selected by the computer. If the random price happens to be equal or lower than your stated buying price of the particular lottery, then you bought the lottery and your pay off will be your endowment minus the random price plus the lottery you bought. If the random price is higher than your buying price of this particular lottery, you receive your endowment.
• When you buy the lottery:
You earn= €10 -the random price + the money from the lottery you bought • When you do NOT buy the lottery:
You earn = €10 Please, do note that, under this procedure, you should state your buying price for the lottery at which you are indifferent between buying and not buying the lottery. The reasons are the following: 1. Suppose you state a too high buying price. Then the random price may fall between your stated buying price and your true valuation. In this case you have to buy the lottery at a price that it is higher then the price you really are willing to pay, and so your pay off will be the endowment minus the random number plus the purchased lottery, while you would have preferred to receive all the endowment. 2. Suppose you state a too low buying price. Then the random price may also fall between your stated and your true valuation. In this case you will not buy the lottery even if its price is smaller than the price you are willing to pay. In this case your pay off will be all the endowment, while you would have preferred to receive the endowment minus the random number plus the purchased lottery.  If you do NOT want to buy the lottery, just put 0.  Your buying price cannot be greater than your endowment. Now, the lotteries will appear on the screen, please state your buying price for each. When you finish up with all lottery situations, click on "DONE".
